EGYPTIAN THREAT

Egypt managed to achieve two relatively peaceful, successful transitions of power since Nasser’s death in September 1970. This is wonderfully surprising and beneficial to the region and the world. Sadat, the vice president, succeeded Nasser in 1970 with little violent outburst. The abject grief in Egypt might account for that, along with a pronounced lack of appreciation of Sadat’s political acumen. General Mubarak, the vice president, ascended to the presidency following Sadat’s assassination in 1981.

Mubarak is in his 80’s and has not chosen a vice president. Although he has never declared his intention, most people are convinced that he has groomed his son, Jamal, as his successor. Such a development will be far from popular in Egypt or the region. In fact, Mubarak and his son are in low repute by many elements in Egypt and throughout the Islamic world, particularly in the Middle East. Corruption, suppression of Islamists, his acceptance of peaceful relations with Israel and a close affiliation with the United States are foremost among the reasons potentially strong and violent elements oppose Mubarak and the prospect of his son continuing these practices and affiliations.

The attitude among the military is crucial in this situation, as it is in the best position to determine the succession to power, perhaps from among one or more individuals among themselves. A military personage in coalition with militant Muslims could probably acquire control without overt opposition. Unless there is a military seizure of power with the consent of key jihadists, the latter will oppose anything short of a committed Islamic rule and the adoption of Sharia (Islamic) law.

While Iran is presently the most influential Middle Eastern nation, a change in Egypt will validate Egypt as the actual fulcrum of Middle Eastern affairs. Egypt’s American/Israeli affiliation since Sadat’s administration removed it from its traditional role as the Arab leader. But, just as Egypt was reluctant to be the Arab leader before Nasser, its primacy as Arab leadership will be readily accepted by whatever strongly Islamic administration that might emerge. Just as under Nasser, other Arab regimes will have no choice but follow Egypt’s lead under influence of the regional Islamic Arab masses. Also, as under Nasser, failure to do so will threaten the demise of other Arab regimes.

Extraordinary American assistance to Egypt since the 1970’s was not charity to improve the lives of our Egyptian brethren. American policy, with the acquiescence of Israel, was a Realpolitick determination that the Arab world could not wage an effective war without Egypt. This became all the more true with the demise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. There is, in fact, the possibility that an improved Egyptian military under American training and an Iraqi military enhanced with military guidance portends to provide unprecedented Arab military capability since the days of Arab expansion in the first couple centuries of Islam.