"EXTRAORDINARY"

The English language is a marvelous vehicle for expression. Its massive vocabulary exceeds all other languages in no small part because of the immense volume of technical terms which have originated in the English speaking world. It is worth remembering the number of nations, such as Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, have enriched the vocabulary. Immigrants to these nations added their own thinly disguised words to the English lexicon.

Also, the English speaking world has never guarded the language. As is all too obvious in modern times new words gush out with only the mildest and ineffective protests from purists. Restrictions on other languages, much like the restriction to enforce Ciceronian Latin, prevail in some fashion. The French Academy, for instance, has guarded against the taint of foreign contamination in any form since the time of Richelieu in the early seventeenth century.

We understand that idiomatic expressions defy sense, logic or other linguistic forensic analysis. We do not, however, regard the word “extraordinary” as idiomatic. We also firmly grasp “ordinary” to mean simple, plain, mundane or other expressions of mediocrity. In an almost Platonic way the English language is rich with nuisance to express degrees of lesser or greater. The prefix “extra” almost always is a superlative that elevates something to a higher level. If this is true, should not “extraordinary” convey the impression that something “extraordinary” would describe something contemptibly low.

WHICH WAY IS EAST?

Orientation program or orientation period are commonly used phrases which almost everyone understands as a period and process for becoming acquainted with a new situation. Orient, as a root of several words, flows freely off American tongues, but it usually relates to the phrases above or Oriental food, Oriental rugs, Oriental art or Oriental furnishings. Oriental is everywhere in America, while it’s opposite, Occidental, seldom occurs in either spoken or written communication.

Traditionally, being “Oriented” meant knowing the compass direction for the East. The assumption was that knowing that direction provided a firm locus for discerning every other direction.

From colonial times residents of America had a strong sense of The North, The South and particularly The West, which offered adventure, wealth and freedom. There was no reason for the shore hugging colonials and later American citizens mentioning The East, where most of them resided. Only people in The West talked about The East.

The East was America and the United States. Large communities, many of which became towns or cities, emerged as elsewhere in the world along protected areas of the ocean’s coast, in favorable spots along rivers, or at intersections of significant roads. With the exception of Washington, D.C., American cities in the East emerged without master plans. The same was even more true for roads, which generally followed the course of least resistance. (For centuries in some mountainous regions of the Middle East road builders would entice a mule to climb a rugged terrain and carve a road in the animal’s course.) Wild animal trails and Indian paths often defined the best way to traverse areas in Eastern America. That resulted in numerous curves in the roads to avoid nature’s obstacles and limited the necessity for excavations and bridges.

My early life in the western part of Virginia accustomed me to roads with abundant curves and at least as many hills and steeper grades. An automobile trip to Richmond at the age of eighteen made an indelible impression on me, as east of Lynchburg I could see miles straight ahead on the road we traveled. There were plenty of gentle hills, but virtually no curves.

Easterners almost never mention the points of the compass when giving directions. They typically say something like “stay on this road for another five miles and turn right at Jamison’s store for another three miles. When you get to that small white church on your left you will see the place you want on the right.”

Moving to South Dakota for my last three years of college required a reorientation based on an awareness of the compass. Even within the symmetrical grids of towns and cities all directions contained compass points without any mention of the Eastern standbys of left and right.

Unlike in the East, most of the West settlement came into existence fairly quickly. Populated areas, as well as the broad farm and ranch lands, resulted from plans rather than haphazard evolution. The flat prairies, which began in Western Ohio, made the grid structure of the Midwest possible. The fact that the United States government, often in conjunction with the railroads, controlled land sales and distribution, allowed those entities to design and control land usage and configuration.

In the East one only needs the fundamental knowledge of the difference between left and right. Out West one needs to be well oriented in knowledge of the four major points of the compass.

CATCH ME IF YOU CAN

From earliest time humans believed they were under the influence of an invisible force or forces. Many believed these ethereal forces were their ancestors, or anthropomorphic gods, or the Great Spirit. Belief in these unseen forces was invariably accompanied by the conviction that they were under their all-seeing scrutiny. Furthermore, the surveiling beings stood in judgment over those they surveiled. Humans behaved knowing the observing entities rewarded acceptable practices and punished those they deemed forbidden.

Consequently, humans constantly tempered their behavior in hope of conforming to acceptable activities. Their entire societies evolved into assuring conformity. Rituals, sacrifices, emblems of those they revered, and the development of sanctified individuals or a priestly class manifested their belief.

Fear of individual or societal disaster was probably the primary motivation for their actions. There was no escape from the wrath of their supernatural overseers if they transgressed acceptable behavior. In time, most societies moved from the belief in short time earthly reward or punishment to belief in eternal repercussions. Eternal, like infinite, is difficult to grasp, but fear of eternal torment and the possibility of eternal bliss had an undeniable impact.

Comprehensive secular law evolved in modern times to encompass punishment for almost all possible transgressions. Legal systems have essentially replaced religious institutions and belief for administering punishment for misbehavior. The only retribution comes from the law if it can catch and convict an offender. So, the escape from punishment is as simple as avoiding the law. It ain’t sin or prosecutable if it isn’t seen.

AMERICAN BARBARIANS: Domestric and Foreign

Nations and empires fall, perish or become absorbed for reasons. One seldom blames them if they perish or become absorbed through overwhelming force. But “falling” connotes failure through avoidable mistakes with accusatory opprobrium. No one, for instance, will blame Atlantis for perishing in an earthquake or Denmark, Luxemburg or Norway subsuming to Hitler’s forces.

But, lo, the Roman Empire, the mightiest state and culture, suffers untold criticism for “falling” from the works of Gibbon in the eighteenth century to the present. Its demise has become the oft cited example of the fate powerful nations might suffer if they do not change their ways. For the last fifty years, warnings that America is on its way to destruction when significant changes occur in its mores and untraditional behavior. Such observations seldom ascribe Rome’s demise to economic, military or other major factors.

An entity as vast and complex as the Roman Empire required numerous elements to become dysfunctional and destroy the empire. That, in fact, happened, but all of the debilitating malfunctions occurred over an extended period of time. The Roman Empire that fell was notably different from The Roman Empire that evolved majestically over decades from its beginning as the Republic of Rome. Romans in the earliest years defined a culture, a law and a sense of their individual and collective identity. Their basic values and policies were practical and fair. By whatever means they devised laws and practices that could apply to all people. People in surrounding areas admired and accepted the principals and practice of the core entity of Rome. None Romans could become Romans with all the rights and privileges of the original Romans simply by accepting and upholding Roman law and culture. Accepting their responsibilities and obligations was central to enjoying the peace and stability of Rome.

A certain level of conformity was and is necessary to create and maintain a viable society. It is misleading to think all citizens of the Republic of Rome and the Roman Empire looked, acted and thought alike. Yes, they had a symbiotic diversity. But, they believed and accepted the same core values. Jews and Christians, for instance, were not persecuted for their religious beliefs but for their unwillingness to conform to Roman law, which included paying at least lip service to the Emperor as a deity. Problems from the Jews and Christians were little more than pimples on the body of Rome, despite what Gibbon said. Also, it is doubtful the great thinkers of Ancient Greece believed in their pantheon of gods, but accepted them as a necessary nuisance.

The real dilution of Roman society and body politic resulted from the massive influx of Germanic barbarians from at least the fourth century onward. Although many performed good services and rose to significant positions of leadership, most did not know or understand the basic original Roman covenant. For most of them Rome was either a haven of safety or an opportunity to plunder or some combination of both. The spoiled Romans were too self-absorbed to realize how fully they had allowed unintegrated aliens to dominate vital societal functions.

Barbarianism is not confined to a particular ethnic group, race or religion. It basically means “stranger” or perhaps, more accurately “outlaw”. Additionally, barbarianism coveys unwillingness to conform to prevailing mores and behavior, through ignorance or overt rejection.

Untold millions of people have entered the United States in recent years with no knowledge or respect for the fundamental principals of American law or society and many with no intention of becoming citizens. Their projected rate of procreation indicates they and their offspring will soon constitute an enormous proportion of the American population.

Perhaps homegrown barbarians constitute as great a threat as those who arrived from foreign lands. Very likely there presently is more ignorance of American history and ideas than any time since the beginning of the republic. Some choose to remain ignorant. The lack of education of American teachers encumbered by supervisory regulations and personal agendas infuses misguided and counter cultural ideas and behavior. Entertainment with the widest appeal is also often contrary to traditional values or perhaps no values or value. Metaphorically, America is “no longer your father’s Oldsmobile”. While few could believe it, General Motors, a stalwart of the American economy, will no longer produce Oldsmobile in its new role as a subsidiary of the United States government.
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“If we are to guard against ignorance and remain free, it is the responsibility of every American to be informed.” Thomas Jefferson

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Hasan al-Banna, who was one of the most influential figures in modern Egyptian and Islamic history, invigorated adherence to Salafiyyah Islam and led the nationalist effort to expel British influence from Egypt. There was a direct connection between al-Banna and the earlier Salafiyyah pioneers in Egypt. He was educated and then taught in the schools Rashid Rida established. He edited Rida’s magazine, al-Manar, from 1939 to 1941. With a grounding in Islamic and Western knowledge he became a primary school teacher in 1927 in Isma’iliyyah on the Suez Canal. His continued relations with associates in Cairo, however, assured that he would not become an isolated and obscure provincial.

There was nothing auspicious about him and six others establishing a chapter of the Hasafiyyah Sufi brotherhood in Isma’iliyyah in 1928, because al-Banna had been a member of that Sufi order as a teenager. The small group which originated to rectify the problems of Islam in their locality very quickly evolved into the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamiyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimum), the most important political-religious organization in modern Egypt. New chapters developed and al-Banna moved its headquarters to Cairo in 1933. The simplicity and honesty of the Muslim Brotherhood attracted a large membership and the rapid creation of new chapters. Safe estimates place its membership at half a million in two thousand chapters by the time of al-Banna’s death in 1949. This is not an accurate measure of its influence, since many who avoided the risk of membership supported its activities.

The expulsion of Great Britain from Egypt dominated al-Banna’s activities. The presence of the British was also a religious problem, however, since the weakness of Egypt’s Islamic society made British occupation possible. The Muslim Brotherhood adopted a policy of education, political activism, and social welfare to meet the immediate needs of its members. A wide spectrum of Egyptians soon regarded the Brotherhood not only as the best means of expelling the British, but also the best source for spiritual and physical security.

In the Salafiyyah tradition, al-Banna said “The Quran is our constitution.” This theme and his insistence that traditional Islam was the only legitimate foundation for a viable Islamic society, could lead to the misconception of al-Banna as a cultural xenophobe. While he only accepted sources of Islamic law in the Sunni tradition, he openly acknowledged the acceptability of non-Islamic knowledge and practice in certain areas. The British presence in Egypt was the only thing which upset Al-Banna more than the widespread belief among his countrymen that Westerners alone had the answers to modern problems. His message urged Egyptians and other Muslims to familiarize themselves with the heart of their religion and use its rich and comprehensive approach to human needs as the guide for creating a strong, modern society built upon an Islamic foundation. He maintained that Islamic teachings encompassed almost everything any society needed in any age. His confidence in Islam led him to assert that Islamic societies could selectively adopt non-Islamic answers when a thorough investigation proved no Islamic answer existed. There was the additional stipulation that Islamic societies should reject anything which directly conflicted with Islamic principles.

The Muslim Brotherhood evolved as a secret underground organization into a political force most other politicians, including the monarchy, courted. Its formidable publications, role in strikes, demonstrations, and even assassinations, appealed to many just as the provision of education, religious guidance, food, medicine, housing and a meaning for life appealed to others. While some militant elements engaged in activities al-Banna did not approve, he exercised a level of control that belied his title of “Supreme Guide.” He proved to be an accomplished politician who allied at one time or another with almost every Egyptian party or group. Branches of the Brotherhood emerged in Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Palestine in an era that secularism dominated. Its strong emphasis on social justice appealed to many who could not embrace the secular, even atheistic, solutions other groups proposed.

The movement which began totally in the open soon adopted an underground approach to avoid suppression. It perfected the use of small cells which early Arab nationalist movements found effective. The small units had the main virtue of limiting damage because authorities could only learn the identities of the five or six people any member might have to divulge under torture or other pressure. Initially members came from lower level government workers, junior military officers, small merchants, teachers, and artisans, but urban working class membership provided the formidable numbers it enjoyed after 1945. From its earliest days it opened schools and mosques, but it soon acquired clinics, factories and businesses. In essence, it constructed a largely self-sufficient society parallel to the Egyptian society which the government administered.

While it was not a political party, it engaged in widespread political activities. Al-Banna advised the leadership of the Free Officers Society on organizational matters and shared political objectives with them while it was still a clandestine movement. Increased anti-British sentiment in Egypt after 1945 gave the Brotherhood and other groups hope of expelling the British. The Brotherhood’s armed element proved relentless and effective in the Palestine war of 1948 and never acquiesced to the truce Egypt and other Arab governments accepted. The government finally outlawed the Brotherhood on December 6, 1948 for its intensified role in demonstrations and strikes and general political effectiveness in collusion with a spectrum of other groups from communists to fascists. A Muslim Brother’s assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister three weeks later led to the secret police assassination of al-Banna on February 12, 1949. The Brotherhood’s strong organization and important role in society, however, negated the Guide’s assassination and the organization’s legal dissolution. It would play an increased role as opposition increased against both the government of King Farouk and a continued British presence.

The Free Officers’ coup of July 23, 1952, which initially appeared favorable to the Brotherhood, soon relegated it to an inconsequential role for nearly three decades. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) recognized the importance and popular appeal of the Brotherhood. They did not dare infringe upon Brotherhood activities when they cavalierly abolished the Wafd and other political parties in 1953. The young officers, who were a group of unknowns, had no popular support as their intentions were unclear. The apparent leadership of General Muhammad Neguib, whom the Brotherhood trusted, was their best hope of retaining their position. The RCC’s obviously secular approach to altering society soon became apparent to the Brotherhood, which also disapproved the terms of the treaty the RCC negotiated with Great Britain in 1954. A Brotherhood member’s attempt on Nasser’s life on October 26, 1954 signaled the end to an uneasy relationship with the RCC. Six Muslim Brothers died on the gallows and the government again outlawed the Brotherhood, which returned underground in Egypt and moved its headquarters to Damascus.

Nasser’s popularity began to soar in Egypt and the Arab world by the summer of 1955. His unique form of Arab nationalism and Arab Socialism soon swept the region. Secular Nasserism rendered minuscule every other possible answer to problems in the Arab world. The RCC even co-opted Islam as an issue through creation of the International Islamic Congress (IIC) in January 1955. The RCC was not willing to say that Islam was unimportant or irrelevant to modern problems, but it made it clear that Islam would serve the regime. As the IIC framed revolutionary Egypt’s relations with the international Islamic world, Islamic institutions within Egypt, including al-Azhar University, became instruments of the secular government. Islamic laws, issues, or principles had nothing more than occasional lip-service importance. The exhilaration which accompanied Nasserism in the 1950's and 1960's hypnotized a region which had not experienced triumph for centuries. Even defeats such as in the 1956 Suez Canal war seemed like victories to people who had been unable even to compete. Adoption of this approach in the Zeitgeist of the era did not require a rejection of Islam. Secular Nasserism seemed so obviously right. It seemed compelled to reject most of the past as it propelled the region into the future. Muslim and Christian Arabs alike envisioned full liberation and fulfillment of their national destiny under Nasser’s leadership. Arab regimes, especially the monarchies, were as inimical as the West. New and modern socialism seemed the hope for the downtrodden underdeveloped nations. Islam almost inadvertently suffered since it was not only old, but the “reactionary” regimes, which were allied to the West, acclaimed their Islamic identification.

The juxtaposition of Muslim Brotherhood and RCC in Egypt was innately explosive as the first could accept nothing less than Islamic and the latter could not accept anything less than total agreement of its means and goals. Their differences were not as apparent when they cooperated marginally in opposition to Farouk’s regime. Anwar Sadat was one of the main links with the Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutub was the one of the main links to the Free Officers. Brotherhood members killed Sadat in 1981 and the RCC hanged Qutub in 1966.

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From: The Modern Middle East; Emory C. Bogle; Prentice Hall Publishers, Upper Saddle River,NJ;1996

WHAT IS PALESTINE

Confusion about Palestine derives in no small part from the fact that Palestine had neither political nor geographical definition prior to the twentieth century. It still does not. There was never a Palestinian state. Whatever Palestine was and wherever it was, generally depended upon individual interpretation. Different portions of the general area had some kind of designation as "Palestine" during the centuries of Roman and Byzantine rule. As part of these empires the function of the areas variously delineated as "Palestine" changed haphazardly, just as the boundaries did, to accommodate local rulers and administrative needs. Beginning with the era of Arab-Islamic rule Palestine was considered part of Bilad al-Sham or Greater Syria.

Jews of the diaspora preferred "Eretz Israel," Land of Israel, and eschewed the use of the term Palestine that did not recognize their claim to the land as their gift from God. Western Christians, who fought crusades to liberate it from Muslims, generally referred to the region as the Holy Land and actually held a great deal of the region as the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, not Palestine, for two centuries.

The people who lived there had little reason to think of themselves as Palestinians until the beginning of the twentieth century. All of them were Ottoman subjects and for centuries any specific identification was usually confined to family and religious affiliation. The predominantly Arab population knew they were not Turks, but since most were Sunni Muslims, they historically did not differentiate between themselves and their Turkish fellow believers. In addition, until the twentieth century there was no significant Arab nationalism with which they could identify. The roughly 15 percent Christian Arab population preserved both their freedoms and limitations through compliance with Ottoman traditions. They, too, had no viable alternative identity, although the Christian western nations interceded in behalf of all Ottoman Christians throughout the nineteenth century. The situation of the smaller Jewish population was similar to that of the Christian Arabs, except there was no Jewish state anywhere to protect or succor it.

Zionists had the clearest concept of the area the Christians called Palestine. For them "Eretz Israel" reached from the Sinai peninsula to the north central Euphrates area east of Damascus; the furthest extent of King David's conquests about 1000 B.C. No Israeli state, before or since, equalled David's brief territorial expansion. No Israeli state of any kind existed from 135 A.D. to 1948. But the halcyon borders in David's time were the perimeters most Zionists envisioned as the land the Balfour Declaration of 1917 promised them as a "national home." The League of Nations mandate seemed to imply that Palestine, indeed, extended to somewhere near the Euphrates, because Article 25 referred to "territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern borders of Palestine."

Britain's creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921, therefore, was a major blow to Zionist plans. Many, however, never altered their goals and most continued to regard Transjordan as an integral part of their patrimony. But, in fact, the British had defined Palestine for modern purposes as the land east of Egypt's Sinai peninsula, south of French mandatory Syria and Lebanon, and west of Transjordan along the west bank of the Jordan River straight southward to the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Regardless of previous attitudes, the indigenous population within these new borders rapidly assumed the identification of "Palestinian." While many Palestinians before this time might have accepted the label of Syrian, French control over Syria and British control over Palestine made identification with Syria less viable. Some Palestinians did, however, increase their hope for a Greater Syrian Arab state at the end of the mandate nightmare. As the King‑Crane findings and other evidence indicates most Arabs in the region envisioned an affiliation with Damascus in the absence of their Turkish overlords. No Palestinians had a sense of being Lebanese and, in fact, most regarded Lebanon, like Palestine, as a part of Syria. Palestinian Arabs had no sense of affiliation with Transjordan and its dusty capital of Amman. The sparse population of that emirate was, after all, primarily bedouin nomads, while the Palestinians were mostly farmers and town dwellers. Affinity with Iraq was equally untenable as it was hundreds of desert miles to the east and less well developed than the western Levant.

Nearly half of the 10,000 square miles of Palestine is barren and unable to support substantial population without extraordinary efforts to supply it with water. Like the area to its north on the eastern Mediterranean Sea, most of the coastal area of Palestine is fertile and extends eastward to the northern Jordan River valley in the east. In this area large‑scale farming of a wide variety of crops, including citrus, is possible and lends itself to the use of the most modern machinery. The central highlands are rocky but provide a favorable condition for grapes, olives, and small‑scale farming of grains and vegetables. There is ample water for a modest population that generally must rely on hand tools and animal power to cultivate the crops. The Jericho region in the Jordan River valley, which is the lowest place on earth, enjoys a tropical climate that is particularly good for the cultivation of dates and bananas. From just east of Jerusalem to the Dead Sea is a rugged wasteland that can sustain a handful of nomads and their flocks. The Negev desert, which constitutes nearly 40 percent of modern Palestine, stretches south of Beersheba to the Gulf of Aqaba. Though arid, it produces a considerable amount of grain and sustains a surprising number of nomads and their livestock.
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From: The Modern Middle East; Emory C. Bogle; Prentice Hall Publishers, Upper Saddle River,NJ;1996

INSHALLAH

Christians of major denominations and smaller divisions alike, often say that something “is God’s will”, “God works in mysterious ways” or “His will be done” in reaction to dramatic events such as death. They also frequently speak about “God’s plan”, which implies belief that everything happens according to the Maker’s design. Generally, Christian theology, while acknowledging God is all-seeing and omnipotent, does not endorse a deterministic interpretation.

Muslims have a more pronounced attitude on the role of God in unfolding events and believe that everything is under God’s guidance and control. This is certainly the case on the part of more traditional Muslims. They submit to following God’s law as defined in the Quran and the teachings and behavior of the prophet Muhammad. Assuming to know more than that about God’s plan is a major apostasy. When speaking about something that might happen in the near or far future they will invariably say “Inshallah”, which means “God willing”. While it is unusual, people have been killed for failing to mention that disclaimer when speaking confidently that something specific would happen at a specific time.

Having studied Islam extensively and been among Muslims countless times over a few decades engendered a strong awareness of this practice. I understood it academically very early in my contact with Muslims. In time it made an indelible impression on me to regard thinking or saying “Inshallah” in the appropriate circumstances. Not doing so is very presumptuous. Perhaps becoming older, wiser and more aware of the fragility of life itself and fulfilling plans increases understanding of uncertainty.

Some regard this Islamic practice as a means of avoiding commitment or building an escape clause into a promise or pledge. In some cases that might well be true. Others consider the utterance of the word as a strong indication of niggardliness among a people who customarily had little regard for punctuality. Supposedly, President Kennedy asked an Arab diplomat if the word was not similar to or the same as the Spanish word “manana”. The Arab is supposed to have responded “Yes, but it does not convey the same sense of urgency”.

You will read this, “Inshallah”.